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Abstract
Computational game theory has many applications in the
modern world in both adversarial situations and the opti-
mization of social good. While there exist many algorithms
for computing solutions in two-player interactions, finding
optimal strategies in multiplayer interactions efficiently re-
mains an open challenge. This paper focuses on computing
the multiplayer Team-Maxmin Equilibrium with Coordina-
tion device (TMECor) in zero-sum extensive-form games.
TMECor models scenarios when a team of players coordi-
nates ex ante against an adversary. Such situations can be
found in card games (e.g., in Bridge and Poker), when a team
works together to beat a target player but communication is
prohibited; or in forest-protection operations, when coordi-
nated groups have limited contact during interdicting illegal
loggers. The existing algorithms struggle to find a TMECor
efficiently because of their high computational costs. To com-
pute a TMECor in larger games, we make the following key
contributions: (1) we propose a hybrid-form strategy repre-
sentation for the team, which preserves the set of equilibria;
(2) we introduce a column-generation algorithm with a guar-
anteed finite-time convergence in the infinite strategy space
based on a novel best-response oracle; (3) we develop an
associated-representation technique for the exact representa-
tion of the multilinear terms in the best-response oracle; and
(4) we experimentally show that our algorithm is several or-
ders of magnitude faster than prior state-of-the-art algorithms
in large games.
1 Introduction
One of the most important problems in artificial intelli-
gence is to design algorithms for agents who make complex
decisions in interactive environments (Russell and Norvig
2016). So far, researchers made significant progress mostly
in non-cooperative two-player games, focusing on find-
ing a Nash Equilibrium (NE) (Nash 1951; von Stengel
1996; Zinkevich et al. 2008) or a Stackelberg equilibrium
(Conitzer and Sandholm 2006). These results paved the way
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for many applications, such as in security games that have
high social impact (Sinha et al. 2018) or poker algorithms
that defeated top human professionals (Moravcˇı´k et al. 2017;
Brown and Sandholm 2018). However, the research in mul-
tiplayer games remains limited. Theoretical results were
achieved only for games with specific structures (e.g.,
polymatrix games (Cai and Daskalakis 2011)), or there are
no theoretical guarantees at all (e.g., the algorithm in
Brown and Sandholm (2019)). Finding and playing NEs in
multiplayer games is difficult due to the following two
reasons. First, computing NEs is PPAD-complete even for
three-player zero-sum games (Chen and Deng 2005). And
second, NEs are neither unique nor exchangeable in mul-
tiplayer games, which makes it almost impossible for the
players who choose their strategies independently to form a
NE together. The research on multiplayer games hence fo-
cuses on alternative solution concepts with more favorable
properties.
Team-Maxmin Equilibrium with Coordination device
(TMECor, TMEsCor as a plural) (Celli and Gatti 2018;
Farina et al. 2018) is a solution concept that models a situa-
tion when a team of players shares the same utility function
and coordinates ex ante against an adversary. That is, the
team members are allowed to discuss and agree on tactics
before the game starts, but they cannot communicate during
the game. Celli and Gatti (2018) show that ex ante coordina-
tion can be modelled using a coordination device, assuming
that the adversary does not observe any signal from the de-
vice. The team members agree on a planned strategy (e.g., a
mixed strategy) in the planning phase, and then, just before
the game starts, the coordination device randomly picks a
pure joint strategy (from the planned strategy) for the team
members to act upon. A TMECor is a NE between the team
(i.e., each team member has no incentive to deviate) and the
adversary in a zero-sum multiplayer extensive-form game,
and it has the properties of NEs in zero-sum two-player
games (e.g., exchangeability). The study of TMECor is mo-
tivated by its ability to capture many real-world scenarios.
For example, in multiplayer poker games, a team may play
against an adversary player, but they cannot communicate
and discuss their strategy during the game due to the rules.
In Bridge, when the game reaches the phase of the play of
the hand, two defenders who form a team play against the de-
clarer. Or in security games in which several different groups
(e.g., NGOs, the Madagascar National Parks, local police,
and community volunteers) aim to protect forests from il-
legal logging (McCarthy et al. 2016), TMECor models the
groups’ inability to communicate while they try to interdict
the escaping loggers.
TMECor has better properties than NE in multiplayer
games; however, computing it is still difficult—it was shown
to be FNP-hard (Celli and Gatti 2018). The problem can
be formulated as a linear program (Celli and Gatti 2018),
where the team plays joint normal-form strategies for all
team members, but each member’s normal-form strategy
space is exponential in the size of the game tree. A Col-
umnGeneration (CG) algorithmwas hence proposed to com-
pute a solution more efficiently (Celli and Gatti 2018). The
most important component of the algorithm is a Best Re-
sponse Oracle (BRO) that computes an optimal strategy of
the team against the adversary’s strategy, but it is in itself
an NP-hard problem (Celli and Gatti 2018). A BRO can be
formulated as a Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) that
involves a large number of integer variables (Celli and Gatti
2018; Farina et al. 2018). As a consequence, the existing ap-
proaches fail to scale up to larger scenarios (see Section 3
for details).
Main Contributions. The most significant outcome of
our work is a new algorithm for computing a TMECor,
which runs several orders of magnitude faster than the state-
of-the-art algorithms and scales to much larger games. To de-
sign this algorithm, we make several key contributions. The
first contribution is a new hybrid-form strategy representa-
tion for the team’s strategy in a TMECor. Based on this rep-
resentation, we develop a CG method that guarantees con-
vergence to a TMECor in a finite number of iterations, de-
spite the fact that the space of our hybrid-form strategies is
infinite. The core component of the CG method is a novel
BRO. Our BRO is formulated as a multilinear program in
which the multilinear terms represent reaching probabilities
for terminal nodes to reduce the number of involved inte-
ger variables. We show that the BRO can be transformed
into an MILP exactly using another contribution: a novel
global optimization technique called Associated Represen-
tation Technique (ART). Another essential property of ART
is that it efficiently generates associated constraints for the
equivalence relations between multilinear terms, which sig-
nificantly speeds up the computation of the BRO’s MILP for-
mulation by reducing its space of feasible solutions. All to-
gether, our approach shows that formulating the problem as
a multilinear program with global optimization techniques
can be significantly faster than the direct formulation as a
linear program.
2 Preliminaries
An imperfect-information extensive-form game
(EFG) is defined by a tuple (N,A,H,L, χ, ρ, u, I)
(Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008). N = {1, . . . , n} de-
notes a finite set of players and A is a finite set of actions.
H is a finite set of nonterminal decision nodes (sequences
of actions (histories)) in the game, with L being a set of
leaf (terminal) nodes. To each nonterminal decision node
the function χ : H → 2A assigns a subset of possible
actions to play, while function ρ : H → N ∪ {c} identifies
an acting player (c denotes chance). Moreover, we denote
Hi = {h | ρ(h) = i, h ∈ H}, ∀i ∈ N . To determinate the
outcomes, we use u = (u1, . . . , un), where ui : L → R is
player i’s utility function assigning a finite utility to each
terminal node. The imperfect observations are modelled
through the set of information sets I = (I1, . . . , In). Ii is
the set of player i’s information sets (a partition ofHi), such
that ρ(h1) = ρ(h2) and χ(h1) = χ(h2) for any Ii,j ∈ Ii
with h1, h2 ∈ Ii,j . We assume that actions are unique to
information sets, i.e., there exists only one information set
Ii,j such that a ∈ χ(Ii,j) for any a ∈ A.
A sequence σi ∈ Σi is an ordered list of actions taken
by a single player i leading to some node h. ∅ stands for
the empty sequence (i.e., a sequence with no actions). We
use seqi(Ii,j) to denote the player i’s sequence leading to
Ii,j ∈ Ii, and seqi(h) for the player i’s sequence leading to
h ∈ H ∪ L. We assume perfect recall, i.e., for each player
i and nodes h1, h2 ∈ Ii,j ∈ Ii, seqi(h1) = seqi(h2). A
realization plan (sequence-form strategy, also representing
a behavioral strategy) of player i is a function ri : Σ→ [0, 1]
satisfying the network-flow constraints:
ri(∅) = 1 (1a)∑
a∈χ(Ii,j)
ri(σia) = ri(σi) ∀Ii,j ∈Ii, σi=seqi(Ii,j) (1b)
ri(σi) ≥ 0 ∀σi ∈ Σi. (1c)
Let Ri be the set of all (mixed) sequence-form strategies.
We call ri a pure sequence-form strategy if ri(σi) ∈ {0, 1}
for all σi ∈ Σi. The set of pure sequence-form strategies is
denoted asRi and naturally, we haveRi ⊆ Ri.
A pure normal-form strategy of player i is a tuple
πi ∈ Πi = ×Ii,j∈Iiχ(Ii,j) specifying one action to play
in each information set of player i. In EFGs, the size of
Πi is exponential in the size of the game tree. A reduced
normal-form strategy specifies actions only in reachable in-
formation sets due to earlier actions. Henceforth, we fo-
cus on reduced normal-form strategies (despite their size
being still exponential in the size of the game tree) and
refer to them as normal-form strategies. A mixed normal-
form strategy xi is a probability distribution over Πi, de-
noted as xi ∈ ∆(Πi). For any pure (mixed) normal-form
strategy there exists an equivalent pure (mixed) sequence-
form strategy (von Stengel 1996). We call two strategies of
player i realization-equivalent (using notation ∼) if they in-
duce the same probabilities for reaching nodes for all strate-
gies of other players. Indeed, two strategies are realization-
equivalent if and only if they correspond to the same realiza-
tion plan (von Stengel 1996).
Team-Maxmin Equilibrium with Coordination Device
(Celli and Gatti 2018; Farina et al. 2018) is a solution con-
cept that models a scenario when a single team T =
{1, . . . , n − 1} with ex ante coordination plays against an
adversary n. We assume the team shares the same utility
ui(l) = uj(l), ∀i, j ∈ T, l ∈ L and the utility of the ad-
versary is un(l) = −uT (l) = −
∑
i∈T ui(l), ∀l ∈ L, i.e.,
it is a zero-sum EFG. The ex ante coordination means that
the team players can communicate only before the game
starts, through a coordination device. A pure strategy of the
team in TMECor is represented by a joint normal-form strat-
egy πT ∈ ΠT = ×i∈TΠi. A mixed strategy xT is then
a probability distribution over ΠT , i.e., xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ). We
use LpiT ,σn ⊆ L to identify a set of terminal nodes reach-
able by strategy profile (πT , σn). Then, the extended utility
function of the team’s pure strategy πT specifies the utility
of profile (πT , σn) due to chance nodes as UT (πT , σn) =∑
l∈LpiT ,σn
uT (l)c(l), where c(l) denotes the chance prob-
ability of reaching l. For the team’s mixed strategy xT , we
formulate the extended expected utility function as:
UT (xT , σn) =
∑
piT∈ΠT
UT (πT , σn)xT (πT ). (2)
Using a realization plan of the adversary, we write
LpiT ,rn to denote a set of terminal nodes reach-
able by strategy profile (πT , rn), and UT (πT , rn) =∑
l∈LpiT ,rn
rn(seqn(l))uT (l)c(l). For a mixed strategy,
UT (xT , rn) =
∑
piT∈ΠT
UT (πT , rn)xT (πT ). (3)
A TMECor (xT , rn) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) (i.e., xT ∈
argmaxxT UT (xT , rn) and rn ∈ argmaxrn −UT (xT , rn))
in which the team is treated as a single player. Therefore, we
have xT ∈ argmaxxT minrn UT (xT , rn) due to the zero-
sum assumption. Because the team members share the same
utility, none of them has an incentive to deviate. A strategy
profile is an ǫ-TMECor if neither the team nor the adversary
is to gain more than ǫ if one of them deviates.
3 Related Work
The Team-Maxmin Equilibrium
(TME) (von Stengel and Koller 1997; Celli and Gatti
2018) is a solution concept closely related to TMECor, in
which a team of players with the same utility function plays
against an adversary independently, without coordination.
Contrary to TMECor, the team members in TME are
assumed to use behavioral strategies. Previous literature
identified two main issues associated with TME. First,
computing a TME, i.e., finding the optimal joint behavioral
strategies of team members, is a non-convex FNP-hard
optimization problem (Celli and Gatti 2018). Second, the
equilibrium strategies of TME might be significantly
suboptimal compared to TMECor because of the lack of
coordination (Celli and Gatti 2018; Farina et al. 2018).
Another complication arises if we attempt to coordinate the
players using behavioral strategies. Due to the lack of com-
munication between team members during the game, the
team experiences imperfect recall. Because of imperfect re-
call, the behavioral strategies are not realization-equivalent
to normal-form strategies induced by the coordination
device, and thus can not capture the correlation between
the team members’ normal-form strategies. This was also
shown to potentially result in considerable losses of utility
to the team (Farina et al. 2018). Moreover, with imperfect
recall, there is even no guarantee for the existence of
an NE in behavioral strategies (Wichardt 2008). Using
normal-formal strategies is hence crucial to TMECor.
Because the number of normal-form strategies is exponen-
tial in the size of the game, Celli and Gatti (2018) proposed
a hybrid representation of players’ strategies to speed up
the computation of TMEsCor. In their representation, only
the adversary uses sequence-form strategies. Their CG algo-
rithm for TMEsCor formulates a BRO using an MILP with
|L| integer variables. However, the algorithm does not scale
well as |L| can be extremely large for games of moderate
size (see Table 2). In an attempt to overcome this issue, Fa-
rina et al. (2018) developed a realization-form strategy repre-
sentation that focuses on the probability distribution on ter-
minal nodes of the game tree. Their representation is then
used to derive an auxiliary game that represents the origi-
nal game in the form of a set of subtrees. In each subtree,
the adversary faces one team member, while they both use
realization-form strategies. Rather than to derive a TMECor-
specific strategy representation, the authors’ approach is to
create a hybrid-form tree structure for the team. An essential
drawback of this approach is that the auxiliary game is based
on the realization-form strategy that is not executable from
the game tree’s root. It requires a cumbersome reconstruc-
tion algorithm to apply it (Celli et al. 2019). On the other
hand, the auxiliary game enables to formulate a faster BRO
with a number of integer variables equal to
∑
i∈T\{1} |Σi|.
Despite being a clear improvement over the approach of
Celli and Gatti (2018), the BRO of Farina et al. (2018) is
still inefficient in larger games with a higher number of se-
quences. Moreover, this BRO is not compatible with asso-
ciated constraints (Zhang and An 2020) that were shown to
significantly improve the scalability by reducing the feasi-
ble solution space of an MILP. In this paper, we develop a
hybrid-form strategy representation inspired by the previous
literature, but which does not depend on the inexecutable
realization-form strategies. Simultaneously, the representa-
tion gives rise to a novel BRO that considerably reduces
the number of integer variables and is compatible with as-
sociated constraints. Moreover, we design a new global opti-
mization technique called ART that does not depend on the
recursive generation of associated constraints proposed by
Zhang and An (2020). ART also works for games with four
or more players, and as we show in the experimental section,
it significantly improves the scalability.We givemore details
on the related work in Appendix A.
4 Hybrid-Form Column Generation with
Efficiently Solvable Multilinear Oracle
Now we describe our novel approach for computing
TMECor efficiently. First, we introduce a new strategy rep-
resentation for the team, and we show how to use this rep-
resentation to compute an exact TMECor. Then we propose
a column-generation algorithm based on our representation,
which iteratively calls a multilinear BRO. Finally, we de-
velop a novel global optimization technique to solve our
BRO efficiently.
4.1 Hybrid-Form Strategies for the Team
In our hybrid-form team strategy representation, one team
member acts according to a (mixed) sequence-form strategy,
Ri set of player i’s mixed sequence-form strategies including ri FT set of pure hybrid-form strategies including fT
Ri set of player i’s pure sequence-form strategies ∆(ΠT ) set of mixed strategies including xT
ΠT set of the team’s joint pure normal-form strategies including πT ∆(FT ) set of mixed strategies including xT
T \ 1 set of the team members except player 1 ∼ realization equivalence
σT (i) the team player i’s sequence in the joint sequence σT Σi set of player i’s sequences including σi
seqi(∗) player i’s sequence reaching a node/information set ∗ ΣT set of the team’s joint sequences including σT
w(σT ) variable representing multilinear term
∏
i∈T ri(σT (i)) Sx support set of mixed strategy x with the size |Sx|
Table 1: The notation used in Section 4, in addition to the standard EFG notation.
while the other members use pure normal-form strategies.1
Any team player can play the sequence-form strategy, and
without loss of generality, we opt for player 1. A pure hybrid-
form strategy of the team is defined by a tuple2:
fT = (r1, πT\{1}),
where r1 ∈ R1, and πT\{1} ∈ ΠT\{1} = ×i∈T\{1}Πi. We
denote FT the set of pure hybrid-form strategies and refer
to xT ∈ ∆(FT ) as a mixed hybrid-form strategy—a prob-
ability distribution over FT . Note that the number of pure
hybrid-form strategies (|FT |) is infinite because each strat-
egy inR1 corresponds to at least one pure hybrid-form strat-
egy, and the size ofR1 is infinite.
Given a strategy profile (fT , σn), we define an ex-
tended utility function of the team’s pure strategy
similarly as UT (πT , σn) in Eq.(2): UT (fT , σn) =∑
l∈LfT ,σn
r1(seq1(l))uT (l)c(l), with LfT ,σn being the
leafs reachable by the profile. The expected utility of a
mixed strategy is then:
UT (xT , σn) =
∑
fT∈FT
UT (fT , σn)xT (fT ).
Using a sequence-form strategy rn of the adversary, an ex-
tended utility function of the team’s pure strategy is defined
(similarly to UT (πT , rn) as in Eq.(3)) as UT (fT , rn) =∑
l∈LfT ,rn
rn(seqn(l))r1(seq1(l))uT (l)c(l), with LfT ,rn
defined accordingly. The corresponding expected utility of
a mixed strategy is:
UT (xT , rn) =
∑
fT∈FT
UT (fT , rn)xT (fT ).
Moreover, we define the support sets in a mixed normal-
form strategy and a mixed hybrid-form strategy as:
SxT = {πT | xT (πT ) > 0, πT ∈ ΠT },
SxT = {fT | xT (fT ) > 0, fT ∈ FT }.
Recall that two team’s strategies are realization-equivalent
if they both define the same probabilities for reaching nodes
given any strategy of the adversary. In the following two
1Note that all team players are free to use pure normal-form
strategies–in that case, our algorithm still works, but it would signif-
icantly slow down the computation when compared with the hybrid-
form strategies, as shown in the experiments. In contrast, if two or
more team players use sequence-form strategies, the reaching prob-
abilities for terminal nodes are no longer exactly representable by
linear constraints (see Eqs.(6a) and (6b)).
2To differentiate between fT and xT (a probability distribution
over the space of fT defined later), we call fT a “pure” hybrid-form
strategy and xT a “mixed” hybrid-form strategy.
Algorithm 1: CG Algoritm with a Multilinear BRO
1 Initialize F ′T ← {any strategy}, v ← 0, v ← 1;
2 repeat
3 (v, xT , rn)← CoreLP(F
′
T ,Σn);
4 (v, fT )← BRO(rn);
5 F ′T ← F
′
T ∪ {fT };
6 until v = v;
7 return (xT , rn).
lemmas, we shown the realization equivalence between the
hybrid-form and the normal-form strategies. All proofs can
be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. ∀xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ), ∃xT ∈ ∆(FT ) such that xT ∼
xT with |SxT | = |SxT |.
Lemma 2. ∀xT ∈ ∆(FT ),∃xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ) such that xT ∼
xT .
Using the two lemmas, we can prove that our hybrid-form
strategies preserve the set of TMEsCor3.
Theorem 1. ∀xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ), ∃xT ∈ ∆(FT ) such that
UT (xT , σn) = UT (xT , σn)(∀σn ∈ Σn), and vice versa.
Because the set of TMEsCor will not change if hybrid-
form strategies are played, the following linear program (LP)
computes the equilibrium:
maxxT v(In(∅)) (4a)
v(In(σn))−
∑
In,j∈In:seqn(In,j)=σn
v(In,j)
≤ UT (xT , σn) ∀σn ∈ Σn (4b)∑
fT∈FT
xT (fT ) = 1 (4c)
xT (fT ) ≥ 0 ∀fT ∈ FT . (4d)
In this LP, In(σn) denotes an information set in which
player n takes the last action of sequence σn, and v(In,j)
is the expected utility of the team in each information set
In,j . The adversary chooses the strategy minimizing the
team’s utility in each information set In(σn) (represented
by Eq.(4b) (Bosansky et al. 2014)), and v(In(∅)) is hence
the team’s utility given xT .
4.2 Column Generation with a Multilinear Oracle
Although we can formulate the problem of finding a
TMECor as an LP (4), solving it requires enumerating all
pure hybrid-form strategies in an infinite strategy space as
3Note that our proofs do not rely on the inexecutable realization-
form strategies of Farina et al. (2018).
variables, which is impractical. To address this problem, we
introduce a CG algorithm with a Multilinear BRO (CMB),
depicted in Algorithm 1. Our CMB starts from a restricted
game (F ′T ,Σn) (F
′
T is a subset of FT ) and proceeds itera-
tively. It computes a TMECor in a subgame and checks if
there exists a better strategy outside the restricted game. If
the answer is positive, it expands the restricted game, and
terminates otherwise.
Now we describe this dynamic in more detail. In Algo-
rithm 1, CoreLP(F ′T ,Σn) in Line 3 computes a TMECor
(xT , rn) with the team’s utility v in the restricted game
(F ′T ,Σn) by solving LP (4). On the next line, the output
fT of our BRO(rn) is a pure hybrid-form strategy maximiz-
ing the team’s utility v when the adversary plays rn, i.e.,
argmaxfT∈FT UT (fT , rn). We will show how to compute
it efficiently later. Thus, starting from the restricted F ′T (ini-
tialized at Line 1), CMB computes the equilibrium (xT , rn)
with the team’s utility v in the restricted game (F ′T ,Σn) by
calling CoreLP (Line 3), and finds the team’s best response
fT with the team’s utility v against the adversary’s strategy
rn in the equilibrium of (F
′
T ,Σn) by calling BRO (Line 4).
Then CMB expands F ′T if a new strategy fT outside of F
′
T
is found (Line 5), otherwise CMB terminates (Line 7).
Our aim is to show that once the algorithm terminates, the
equilibrium in the restricted game is an equilibrium in the
full game (FT ,Σn). Unfortunately,most column-generation
algorithms usually rely on the fact that the strategy space
is finite, and the number of iterations is hence bounded to
enforce a guarantee of convergence (Bosansky et al. 2014;
McMahan, Gordon, and Blum 2003). Since a strategy space
in our CMB is infinite, this argument can not hold. In the fol-
lowing proposition, we show that despite the number of pure
hybrid-form strategies being infinite, the CMB will always
terminate in a finite number of steps. The intuition behind
our result is that if a best-response strategy fT is added to
the restricted game, instead of representing a single strategy,
it stands for a whole subset of hybrid-form strategies in the
BRO due to the mixed sequence-form strategy of the first
player.
Proposition 1. CMB converges in at most 2|Π1| |ΠT ||Π1| steps.
Even though this result implies that there always exists a
TMECor with a finite-sized support set for the team, it is a
rather weak guarantee. We hence provide a tighter bound on
the size of the team’s support set4.
Proposition 2. There is a TMECor xT with |SxT | ≤ |Σn|.
Our experimental results show that the actual number of it-
erations before CMB converges is significantly smaller than
the bound from Proposition 1. We attribute this to the fact
that at least one TMECor has a small support set, as shown
in Proposition 2. Finally, we prove that the output of CMB
is a TMECor in the full game because the team cannot find
a better strategy outside the restricted game.
Theorem 2. CMB converges to a TMECor in (FT ,Σn).
4A similar result was proven for normal-form strategies ear-
lier (Celli and Gatti 2018); however, Proposition 2 is not its direct
consequence as it relies on Lemma 1 that makes the connection
between normal-form and hybrid-form strategies.
Moreover, we show that if the BRO checks for the exis-
tence of a best-response strategy with a gain at most ǫ out-
side the restricted game, the CMB converges to an approxi-
mate TMECor. This is achieved simply by changing the ter-
mination condition from v = v to v − v ≤ ǫ.
Proposition 3. If CMB terminates with v − v ≤ ǫ, then its
output (xT , rn) is an ǫ-TMECor in (FT ,Σn).
The BRO can be formulated as the following multilin-
ear program that computes a best response fT against a
sequence-form strategy rn of the adversary:
max
×i∈T ri
∑
l∈L
uT (l)c(l)rn(seqn(l))
∏
i∈T
ri(seqi(l)) (5a)
Eqs.(1a)− (1c) ∀i ∈ T (5b)
ri(σi) ∈ {0, 1} ∀σi ∈ Σi, i ∈ T \ {1} (5c)
r1(σ1) ∈ [0, 1] ∀σ1 ∈ Σ1, (5d)
where ri ∈ Ri is realization-equivalent to πi ∈ Πi for all
i in T \ {1} in a hybrid-form strategy fT . The idea of the
BRO is that it expresses the probability of all team play-
ers reaching each terminal node using a multilinear term∏
i∈T ri(seqi(l)) with only
∑
i∈T\{1} |Σi| integer variables.
4.3 Associated Representation Technique
Because problem (5) is multilinear and thus difficult to solve,
we develop a novel global optimization technique for find-
ing a solution efficiently. We call the method the Associated
Representation Technique (ART). The ART represents the
multilinear terms exactly through linear constraints. More-
over, it reduces the feasible solution space by using associ-
ated constraints for the equivalence relations between the in-
dividual multilinear terms. From the computational perspec-
tive, ART’s two essential properties are that (i) it does not re-
quire recursive expansion to represent the multilinear terms
exactly, and (ii) it generates the associated constraints effi-
ciently.
Multilinear Representation (MR) First, we show how
to transform problem (5) into an equivalent MILP exactly,
without introducing new integer variables. For this purpose,
for each multilinear term w(σT ) =
∏
i∈T ri(σT (i)), where
σT (i) is the sequence of player i in joint sequence σT ∈ ΣT
with ΣT = ×i∈TΣi, ri ∈ Ri for all i ∈ T \ {1}, and
r1 ∈ R1, we introduce the following MR constraints:
0 ≤ w(σT ) ≤ ri(σT (i)) ∀i ∈ T \ {1} (6a)
0 ≤ r1(σT (1))− w(σT ) ≤ n− 2−
∑
i∈T\{1}
ri(σT (i)). (6b)
Proposition 4.
∏
i∈T ri(σT (i)) with ri ∈ Ri∀i ∈ T \ {1},
r1 ∈ R1 is exactly represented by w(σT ) in Eqs.(6a)–(6b).
Efficient Generation of Associated Constraints By us-
ing the MR constraints, problem (5) becomes an MILP,
which can be solved using a standard branch-and-bound
approach with an LP relaxation (Morrison et al. 2016).
However, relaxing the MR constraints may result in a
much larger feasible solution space. To be more specific,
as a consequence of making the variable ri(σT (i)) real-
valued, the variable w(σT ) may no longer exactly rep-
resent
∏
i∈T ri(σT (i)) in Eqs.(6a) and (6b), as intended.
Therefore, we aim to reduce the feasible solution space
of w(σT ). For this purpose, we generate associated con-
straints enforcing equivalence relations between multilinear
terms, that are based on network-flow constraints (1a)-(1c)
for the sequence-form strategies. As an example, suppose
that we have the multilinear terms w,w1, w2 and w
′ with
w = r1(σ1)w
′, w1 = r1(σ1a)w
′, w2 = r1(σ1b)w
′. A
constraint for the sequence-form strategy r1 requires that
r1(σ1) = r1(σ1a) + r1(σ1b). Therefore, we can introduce
an associated constraint w = w1 + w2. Adding associated
constraints immediately rules out some candidate solutions,
which effectively reduces the MILP’s solution space and re-
sults in faster computation.
Because the associated constraints are closely related to
the network-flow constraints of sequence-form strategies,
they can be generated in a similar manner—through infor-
mation sets. And because the variable w(×i∈T seqi(l)) used
by MR constraints to represent the product
∏
i∈T ri(seqi(l))
involves all team members’ sequences, the associated con-
straints are generated for all information sets of all mem-
bers. For example, consider a four-player Kuhn poker game,
in which a terminal node is reached by the team’s joint se-
quence tuple (J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:c). The three
sequences are taken by three team players in informa-
tion sets J:/cccr:, Q:/cccrc:, T:/cccrcc:, respectively. As-
sume that the information set T:/cccrcc: of player 3 is reach-
able by a sequence T:/cc:c. The information set contains a
node (J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cc:c,K:/ccc:r), specified by
one sequence per each player. There are two possible actions
that can be taken: action c and action f . The network-flow
constraint associated with this information set is hence:
r3(T:/cc:c) = r3(T:/cccrcc:c) + r3(T:/cccrcc:f).
The corresponding associated constraint is:
w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cc:c)
=w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:c)
+ w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:f).
Now assume that there is another node
(J:/cccr:c, K:/cccrc:c, T:/cc:c, Q:/ccc:r) in the same
information set, and a terminal node with the team’s joint
sequence (J:/cccr:c, (K:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:c) reachable by
action c of player 3. The following associated constraint is
generated:
w(J:/cccr:c, K:/cccrc:c, T:/cc:c)
=w(J:/cccr:c, K:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:c)
+ w(J:/cccr:c, K:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:f).
Using the same approach, we can generate associated con-
straints in this Kuhn poker game in all team players’ infor-
mation sets. More details can be found in Appendix C.
Therefore, in a general EFG, in each information set Ii,j
of a team member i, the algorithm for generating associ-
ated constraints needs to enumerate all the team’s joint se-
quences leading to Ii,j , which correspond to different nodes
in Ii,j . We denote this set of sequences as ΣT (Ii,j) and use
seqi(Ii,j) = σT (i) for all σT = (σT (i), σT\{i}) ∈ ΣT (Ii,j).
The associated constraints for Ii,j are then:
w(σT )=
∑
a∈χ(Ii,j)
w(σT (i)a, σT\{i})
∀σT ∈ ΣT (Ii,j), Ii,j ∈ Ii, i ∈ T.
(7)
Generating all the constraints can be thus done in time
O(
∑
i∈T
∑
Ii,j∈Ii
|ΣT (Ii,j)|). The resulting MILP for rep-
resenting problem (5) using Eqs.(6a)-(6b) and (7) can be for-
mulated as follows:
max
×i∈T ri
∑
l∈L
uT (l)c(l)rn(seqn(l))w(×i∈T seqi(l)) (8a)
Eqs.(5b)− (5d), (7) (8b)
Eqs.(6a)− (6b) ∀w(×i∈T seqi(l)), l ∈ L. (8c)
Our final theorem proves that associated constraints preserve
the sequence-form strategy space, making the solution of for-
mulation (8) also a feasible solution of our BRO in CMB.
Theorem 3. The solution of problem (5) solves problem (8).
Corollary 1. Given rn, the optimal solution of Problem (8)
is a best response against rn.
5 Experimental Evaluation
Finally, we demonstrate the performance of our CMB algo-
rithm. We compare CMB to the previous state-of-the-art al-
gorithms: (i) the original CG algorithm in Celli and Gatti
(2018) (referred to as C18); (ii) the CG with the BRO pro-
posed by Farina et al. (2018) (referred to as F18), and (iii) the
CMB with the associated constraints generation algorithm
of Zhang and An (2020) (referred to as CMBZ20). We use
two standard EFG domains for evaluating the algorithms: (i)
the Kuhn poker, and (ii) the Leduc Hold’em poker. Formal
definitions of the domains can be found in Appendix D. We
denote an n-player Kuhn instance with r ranks (i.e., r cards)
as nKr, and refer to an n-player Leduc Hold’em instance
with r ranks (i.e., 3r cards) as nLr. Without a loss of gen-
erality, the last player assumes the role of the adversary. All
(MI)LPs are solved by CPLEX 12.9 on a machine with 6-
core 3.6GHz CPU and 32GB of memory.
Runtimes.We present the runtime results in Table 2. We
omit the runtimes of CMBZ20 because it performs simi-
larly to CMB, but evaluate their differences further in larger
games and report the results in Table 3. For assessing abla-
tions, we compare CMB to its four variant: (i) CMB with-
out associated constraints (referred to as CMB/A); (ii) CMB
that uses continuous variables to represent reaching proba-
bilities for terminal nodes without using our ART and BRO
(referred to as CMB/ART); (iii) CMB with BRO generat-
ing joint pure normal-form strategies instead of hybrid-form
strategies (referred to as CMB/H), and (iv) CMB/ART/H—
a combination of (ii) and (iii). The results clearly show that
CMB is several orders of magnitude faster than the reference
algorithms.Moreover, CMB also outperforms all ablation al-
gorithms, which strongly suggests that each component of
CMB significantly boosts its performance.
Convergence and Supports. In Table 4, we report the
number of iterations CMB needs to converge to an exact
EFG |L| |Σi| CMB CMB/H CMB/A CMB/ART CMB/ART/H C18 F18
3K4 312 33 0.7s 0.7s 2.1s 4s 6s 6.8s 1.2s
3K6 1560 49 2s 2s 20s 191s 479s >5h 12s
3K8 4368 65 4s 4s 497s 7160s >5h 210s
3K10 9360 81 5s 6s 10530s >5h 3541s
3K12 17160 97 10s 10s >5h >5h
4L31 30600 219 68s 165s
4L32 638064 219 1264s 2155s
3L3 249480 457 4916s 6500s
4K9 99792 145 2.6h 3.8h
3L5∗ 10020 1001 4.4h >6h
Table 2: The runtimes of algorithms computing TMECor. The difficulty of finding a solution increases from top to bottom. We
use the notation ‘> nh’ to indicate that an algorithm did not terminate after n hours on the current and all larger instances. We
assume that the largest 3L5∗ instance has five cards, and team players do not take action “raising” in 4L31 (6 cards) and 4L32.
EFG 5K11 5K12 5K13 6K7 6K8 6K9 7K7
CMB 35s 58s 104s 17s 64s 216s 56s
CMBZ20 2802s 6319s >3h 2009s >3h >3h >15h
Table 3: The runtimes of the CMB algorithm and the
CMBZ20 algorithm for computing TMECor in larger games.
We use the same notation as in Table 2.
EFG 3K4 3K6 3K8 3K10 3K12 3L3
Iterations 14 36 47 45 52 1022
Support size 3 5 8 6 10 63
Table 4: The number of iterations until CMB converges, and
the size of the support set of the team’s TMECor strategy.
TMECor, together with the team’s equilibrium strategy sup-
port size. The number of iterations is significantly smaller
than the theoretical upper bound 233 × 33 derived in Propo-
sition 15. The support sets in TMECor also remain small.
Approximation. In the next experiment, we evaluate
CMB’s ability to compute an ǫ∆u-TMEsCor, where ∆u is
the difference between the maximum and minimum achiev-
able utility of the team. We compare CMB to Fictitious
Team Play (FTP) (Farina et al. 2018). We use the setting of
FTP reported in Farina et al. (2018), including their BRO’s
time limit of 15s. Note that their BRO can not run on large
games otherwise. The results in Table 5 show that CMB runs
significantly faster than FTP. For example, CMB is at least
two orders of magnitude faster than FTP on large games
with small ǫ, e.g., ǫ = 0.01. Moreover, according to the
results, it is almost impossible for FTP to converge to an
ǫ∆u-TMECor with an even smaller ǫ (e.g., ǫ = 0.0001),
let alone an exact TMECor. For 3K4—the smallest game
in our experiments—FTP is unable to converge to an ǫ∆u-
TMECor with ǫ = 0.0004 in 100 hours6. In contrast, CMB
computes an exact TMECor within 0.7s, as shown in Table
2.
5|Σi| = 33 in 3K4, whereas |Πi| is significantly greater.
6ǫ reaches 0.0005 in 2674s but then it fluctuates around 0.001.
ǫ 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.008
CMB 0.41s 0.41s 0.41s 0.50s 0.50s 0.58s 0.58s
FTP 0.55s 0.71s 0.82s 1.3s 3.8s 8.0s 11.0s
CMB 0.08s 0.08s 0.16s 0.16s 0.29s 0.50s 0.87s
FTP 4.0s 6.6s 8.1s 15.5s 72.3s 181s 243s
CMB 0.23s 0.23s 0.31s 0.31s 0.64s 1.1s 1.1s
FTP 34.6s 34.6s 67.7s 94.9s 171s 382s 458s
CMB 2s 3s 6s 13s 41s 87s 111s
FTP 228s 307s 458s 689s 1574s 4882s >5h
CMB 5s 7s 13s 28s 93s 745s 1533s
FTP 188s 251s 362s 619s >5h
CMB 23s 27s 37s 108s 490s 3357s 8221s
FTP 164s 215s 371s 920s >5h
Table 5: The runtimes of algorithms computing ǫ∆u-
TMEsCor. The games from the top to the bottom are 3K4,
3K8, 3K12, 3L3, 3L4, and 3L5. ∆u = 6 for 3Kr and
∆u = 21 for 3Lr. The sizes and notations are the same as
in Table 2. In addition, |L| ≈ 106 with |Σi| = 801 for 3L4,
and |L| ≈ 3 · 106 with |Σi| = 1241 for 3L5.
Comparison to TME. The last experiment demonstrates
the difference between TMECor and TME discussed in Sec-
tion 3, both in runtime and the team’s utility. Previous liter-
ature has shown that the team suffers large losses in utility
when resorting to TME strategies instead of TMECor strate-
gies in 3K3–3K7 (Farina et al. 2018). In Table 6, we report
the results on larger 3K8–3K12. Because of the encountered
difficulty to compute an exact TME, we use the state-of-the-
art algorithm of Zhang and An (2020) to approximate the
TME by computing an ǫ∆u-TME with ǫ = 0.01. The results
show that approximating a TME takes significantly longer
than computing a TMECor, while at the same time, the TME
strategies are inferior to the TMECor strategies.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a new algorithm for finding a TMECor in large
zero-sum multiplayer EFGs. Our algorithm is based on a
novel hybrid-formstrategy representation of the team, which
gives rise to a column-generation method with guaranteed
convergence in finite time. The heart of the algorithm is
EFG 3K8 3K9 3K10 3K11 3K12
t
TMECor 4s 4s 5s 10s 10s
TME 4s 5s 84s 437s 118s
u
TMECor -0.019 -0.018 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014
TME -0.066 -0.044 -0.068 -0.050 -0.055
Gap 71% 59% 77% 71% 74%
Table 6: The runtimes t and the team’s utilities u for com-
puted TMEs and TMEsCor solutions. We calculate the gap
as the relative distance between the team’s utility (uCor) in a
TMECor and the one (uTME) in a TME, i.e.,
|uTME−uCor |
|uTME |
×
100%. Greater gap indicates that the team will lose more if
it opts for the TME strategy.
a multilinear best-response oracle that can be queried effi-
ciently using our associated representation technique. We
show that our algorithm computes a TMECor significantly
faster than previous state-of-the-art baselines. In the future,
due to the difficulty of computing the best-response oracle,
we would like to explore the possibility of improving our
oracle by reinforcement learning (Timbers et al. 2020) or re-
gret minimization (Celli et al. 2019).
Broader Impact
Game-theoretic solutions, including our algorithm, have
both descriptive and prescriptive applications in suitable
competitive environments, including businesses, politics, or
even gambling. Finding the equilibria helps to understand
people’s behavior when interacting in dynamic situations
and makes it easier to construct effective decisions to opti-
mize multiagent systems. For example, the manufacturers in
competitive markets may find better pricing strategies if they
consider the decision-making of their competitors. While
abusing the theories, e.g., by gamblers in casinos, is also fea-
sible, the same approach also allows for identifying strate-
gic violators by predicting their behavior. A notable draw-
back of traditional solution concepts like TMECor is their
dependence on involved players’ rational behavior. In case
we suspect them to behave irrationally, we have to extend
our models.
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Appendix
A Comparison to Existing Work
A TMECor can be computed via normal-form strategies
for all players. However, in EFGs, each player’s normal-
form strategy space is exponential in the size of the game
tree. To compute TMEsCor more efficiently, Celli and Gatti
(Celli and Gatti 2018) propose a hybrid representation of
strategy spaces, in which the team plays joint normal-form
strategies while the adversary plays sequence-form strate-
gies. Farina et al. (2018) then develop a realization-form
strategy representation for all players focusing on the prob-
ability distribution on terminal nodes of the game tree, and
then they use it to derive an auxiliary game representing the
original game through a set of subtrees. Each subtree is a
two-player game between one team member and the adver-
sary, in which the two players use realization-form strate-
gies7, while a joint pure normal-form strategy of the remain-
ing team members is fixed. Although the auxiliary game
uses a hybrid-form strategy for the team, it is not a strat-
egy representation on its own. Most importantly, it is based
on the realization-form strategy that is not executable from
the root of the game tree. To make a realization-form strat-
egy executable, the authors need to reconstruct an equivalent
normal-form strategy. The problem is that the reconstruction
is difficult in large games. The only existing reconstruction
algorithm (Algorithm 2 in Celli et al. (2019)) runs in time
O(|L|2), and thus does not scale to large games (see Table
2 for the large number of terminal nodes). To avoid such
a cumbersome reconstruction algorithm, we propose a new
strategy representation for the team, which can be executed
from the root immediately. That is, in our hybrid-form strate-
gies, one team member uses sequence-form strategies (in-
stead of realization-form strategies) while other team mem-
bers use pure normal-form strategies. However, it is not clear
whether our strategy representation with an infinite number
of pure strategies (due to the sequence-form strategies of one
member) can be used to compute exact TMEsCor (see the
explanation in Section 4.2).8 Fortunately, we theoretically
show that our CG (i.e., the CMB algorithm) guarantees a
convergence to a TMECor within a finite number of itera-
tions despite our infinite strategy space. Therefore, although
similar structures to our hybrid-form strategy exist in the lit-
erature, we are the first to use it as the team’s strategy repre-
sentation without depending on the inexecutable realization-
7Although the team member’s realization-form strategy can be
induced by a behavioral strategy in the subtree, the theoretical
result proving the equivalence between the auxiliary game and
the original game is based solely on the realization-form strategy.
Moreover, the authors’ algorithm Fictitious Team-Play (FTP) also
assumes that the team member uses a realization-form strategy that
needs to be transformed into a normal-form strategy to be executed
from the root. And although the team member’s strategy is repre-
sented as a sequence-form strategy in the MILP formulation of the
authors’ BRO, it still has to be transformed into a realization-form
strategy in the FTP.
8Farina et al. (2018) do not discuss this problem for their contin-
uous realization-form strategy space because they aim to compute
approximate TMEsCor.
form strategies. Moreover, we theoretically show how to use
it to compute exact TMEsCor.
Another key component of CG algorithms for computing
TMEsCor is the BRO. The first BRO was proposed by Celli
and Gatti (Celli and Gatti 2018). It expresses whether or not
a leaf is reached by a pure joint normal-form strategy of
all team members (see details in Appendix A.1) using |L|
integer variables. Therefore, it is able to solve only small
games. Farina et al. (2018) develop a faster BRO that de-
creases a number of integer variables by expressing the util-
ity of the joint pure normal-form strategy of all team mem-
bers (except one) given the realization-form strategy of other
players. However, although the number of integer variables
is significantly reduced to the number of sequences of all
team members (except one), this BRO is still inefficient in
large games with a large number of sequences. To speed up
the computation, one possible approach is to add associated
constraints (Zhang and An 2020) (see Appendix A.2) to re-
duce the feasible solution space of the MILP representing
the BRO.9 Unfortunately, the BRO of Farina et al. (2018)
is not compatible with associated constraints (see details in
Appendix A.3). Therefore, it is not possible to directly add
associated constraints to this BRO. Overall, the main differ-
ence between different BRO approaches is in how they rep-
resent the team’s reaching probabilities for terminal nodes
with utilities, which affects the number of integer variables
and the compatibility with associated constraints. Our for-
mulation is the first BRO that reduces the number of integer
variables and simultaneously is compatible with associated
constraints (see Table 7).
Associated constraints are used to reduce the feasible so-
lution space of an MILP for computing a TME in Zhang
and An (2020). These associated constraints are generated
by a global optimization technique, which is based on the re-
cursive McCormick relaxation (see details in Appendix A.4)
(McCormick 1976; Ryoo and Sahinidis 2001). In our case,
we can use the recursive McCormick relaxation to exactly
transform the multilinear BRO into an MILP. However, we
then need to recursively generate associated constraints on
the path from the terminal nodes to the root, which also re-
quires introducing new terms for sequences reaching nonter-
minal nodes frequently, similarly to the algorithm in Zhang
and An (2020). When the number of team players is large,
the number of variables in each multilinear term increases,
which results in many more performed recursive operations.
This recursive generation of associated constraints under-
mines the effort to improve the speed by reducing the feasi-
ble solution space when the number of team players is large.
We hence develop the global optimization technique ART,
which does not depend on the recursive method and gener-
ates associated constraints more efficiently.
9Adding associated constraints, to our best knowledge, is the
only known effective method to do that.
New representation
BRO
Integer variables Compatible Reduce space
Celli and Gatti (2018) Yes |L| Yes No
Farina et al. (2018) Yes
∑
i∈T\{1} |Σi| No No
Our approach Yes
∑
i∈T\{1} |Σi| Yes Yes
Table 7: Comparison of existing approaches to compute TMEsCor in terms of the strategy representation, the number of integer
variables (|L| is significantly larger than
∑
i∈T\{1} |Σi| in EFGs) in BRO, the compatibility of BRO with associated constraints,
and reducing the feasible solution space of BRO.
A.1 Reaching Probability for Each Leaf
Represented by a Binary Integer Variable
(Celli and Gatti 2018)
The first BRO proposed for computing TMEsCor
(Celli and Gatti 2018) expresses whether or not a leaf
is reachable by a pure joint normal-form strategy (repre-
sented by the sequence-form strategy) of all team members.
The corresponding MILP (all payoffs of the team are
assumed to be positive) is:
max
×i∈T ri,y
∑
l∈L
uT (l)c(l)rn(seqn(l))y(l)
y(l) ≤ ri(seqi(l)) ∀i ∈ T, l ∈ L
y(l) ∈ {0, 1}
Eqs.(1a)− (1c) ∀i ∈ T,
where uT (l) is the utility of the team when terminal node l
is reached with probability c(l) due to chance nodes, y(l) ∈
{0, 1} reflects whether or not a leaf is reached by a pure joint
normal-form plan, and rn(seqn(l)) is the known adversary’s
strategy.
We can see that the number of integer variables is equal
to |L|, which is large even for games of moderate size. The
large number of integer variables makes the BRO ineffi-
cient and hence slows down the CG algorithm for comput-
ing TMEsCor. This approach can compute TMEsCor only
for very small three-player Kuhn poker games.
A.2 Associated Constraints (Zhang and An 2020)
Adding associated constraints, to our best knowledge, is the
only known effective method for reducing the feasible so-
lution space of the MILP representing the BRO.10 Associ-
ated constraints (Zhang and An 2020) enforce the equiva-
lence relations betweenmultilinear terms in accordancewith
to the network-flow constraints for sequence-form strategies
(Eqs.(1a)− (1c)). For example, suppose we have the follow-
ing multilinear terms:
w = r1(σ1)w
′
w1 = r1(σ1a)w
′
w2 = r1(σ1b)w
′,
10More precisely, in our case, the associated constraints reduce
the feasible solution space when the MILP is solved by the branch-
and-bound approach with the LP relaxation (Morrison et al. 2016).
For simplicity, we say that we reduce the feasible space of an MILP.
and the following constraint of sequence-form strategies:
r1(σ1) = r1(σ1a) + r1(σ1b).
Then, we can generate the associated constraint
w = w1 + w2.
A more concrete example is in Appendix C.
A.3 Incompatibility with Associated Constraints
(Farina et al. 2018)
Farina et al. (2018) develop a faster BRO that expresses the
utility of the joint pure normal-form strategy (represented by
the joint sequence-form strategy) of all team members (ex-
cept one), given the realization-form strategy of other play-
ers. The algorithm of the authors defines a term for each joint
sequence of the remaining team members. For example, in
the game with three players, the utility is represented by a
variable w(σ2) for sequence σ2, and then the corresponding
MILP (Farina et al. 2018), assuming all payoffs of the team
are positive, is
max
w,r1,r2
∑
σ2∈Σ2
w(σ2)
w(σ2) ≤ u(σ2) ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2
w(σ2) ≤Mr2(σ2) σ2 ∈ Σ2
Eqs.(1a)− (1c) ∀i ∈ T
r2(σ2) ∈ {0, 1} ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2
r1(σ1) ≥ 0 ∀σ1 ∈ Σ1,
where M is the maximum payoff of the team, u(σ2) =∑
σ1∈Σ1
uωnσ1,σ2r1(σ1), w(σ2) can be rewritten as a mul-
tilinear term according to its definition, i.e., w(σ2) =
r2(σ2)u(σ2), r1(σ1) ∈ [0, 1] (representing the realization-
form strategy of player 1) and r2(σ2) ∈ {0, 1} are the
probabilities when the corresponding sequence is played un-
der the sequence-form strategy, uωnσ1,σ2 is the known util-
ity given the adversary realization-form strategy ωn and se-
quences σ1 and σ2 of the team. For games with more than
three players, sequence σ2 is replaced by a joint sequence
×i∈T\{1}σi. Suppose we have the following two additional
bilinear terms:
w(σ2a) = r2(σ2a)u(σ2a)
w(σ2b) = r2(σ2b)u(σ2b),
and the following constraint of the sequence-form strategy:
r2(σ2) = r2(σ2a) + r2(σ2b).
We are not able to generate the associated constraint
w(σ2) = w(σ2a) + w(σ2b) because the utilities (i.e.,
u(σ2), u(σ2a), and u(σ2b)) in these terms usually differ.
Consequently, the BRO of Farina et al. (2018) is not compat-
ible with associated constraints. The reason is that when the
utility is included in multilinear terms, the remaining parts
(e.g., u(σ2), u(σ2a), and u(σ2b))) in different terms are usu-
ally not the same if one variable (e.g., r2(σ2), r2(σ2a), or
r2(σ2b)) in each term is fixed. We hence can not directly
generate associated constraints to reduce the feasible solu-
tion space of this BRO. In contrast, the multilinear terms
(i.e.,
∏
i∈T ri(seqi(l))) in our BRO formulation (problem
(5)), only represent the the team’s reaching probabilities for
terminal nodes, and are thus compatible with associated con-
straints.
Another drawback of this approach is that player 1’s
sequence-form strategy computed by the BRO has to be
transformed into an equivalent realization-form strategy in
their FTP (Farina et al. 2018). Moreover, one additional ad-
vantage of our ART is that unlike the presented existing ap-
proaches, our BRO does not require that all payoffs of the
team are positive.
A.4 McCormick Relaxation
The McCormick relaxation (McCormick 1976) is a tech-
nique for approximating a bilinear term w = yiyj (yi, yj ∈
[0, 1]) by loose inequalities max{0, yi + yj − 1} ≤ w ≤
min{yi, yj}. The recursive version (Ryoo and Sahinidis
2001) of this approach uses a new variable to replace each
bilinear part in the multilinear term recursively. For exam-
ple, the multilinear term w′ = yiyjyh is recursively defined
as two bilinear terms w′ = wyh and w = yiyj , and then
the McCormick inequalities are generated for each bilinear
term separately. A new technique inspired by this approach
(Zhang and An 2020) adds integer variables to increase pre-
cision by generating tighter bounds.
B Proofs
Lemma 1. ∀xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ), ∃xT ∈ ∆(FT ) such that xT ∼
xT with |SxT | = |SxT |.
Proof. As wementioned in Section 2, any pure normal-form
strategy π1 ∈ Π1 can be uniquely represented by a pure
sequence-form strategy r1 ∈ R1, i.e., any pure normal-
form strategy π1 ∈ Π1 is realization-equivalent to a pure
sequence-form strategy r1 ∈ R1. Obviously, if π1 ∼ r1,
(π1, πT\{1}) ∼ (r1, πT\{1}),
where π1 ∈ Π1 and r1 ∈ R1. For any mixed normal-form
strategy xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ), we define a mixed hybrid-form strat-
egy xT ∈ ∆(FT ) such that:
xT (r1, πT\{1}) = xT (π1, πT\{1})
∀(π1, πT\{1}) ∈ ΠT , π1 ∼ r1, r1 ∈ R1,
and xT (fT ) = 0 for other strategies fT ∈ FT \
{(r1, πT\{1}) | r1 ∈ R1}. Given any adversary strategy
rn (or σn) and any node h ∈ H ∪ L, let PpiT (h) be πT ’s
reaching probability for h. Then xT ’s reaching probability
for h is:
∑
(pi1,piT\{1})∈ΠT
xT (π1, πT\{1})P(pi1,piT\{1})(h)
=
∑
(r1,piT\{1})∈FT ,r1∼pi1
xT (r1, πT\{1})P(pi1,piT\{1})(h),
which is xT ’s reaching probability for h. Hence, xT ∼ xT
and |SxT | = |SxT |.
Lemma 2. ∀xT ∈ ∆(FT ),∃xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ) such that xT ∼
xT .
Proof. As we mentioned in Section 2, any sequence-form
strategy r1 ∈ R1 is realization-equivalent to a mixed
normal-form strategy x1 ∈ ∆(Π1). Obviously, if x1 ∼ r1,
(x1, πT\{1}) ∼ (r1, πT\{1}),
where x1 ∈ ∆(Π1) and r1 ∈ R1. For any mixed hybrid-
form strategy xT ∈ ∆(FT ), we define a mixed normal-form
strategy xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ) such that:
xT (π1, πT\{1}) =
∑
(r1,piT\{1})∈FT ,x1∼r1
xT (r1, πT\{1})x1(π1)
∀(π1, πT\{1}) ∈ ΠT .
Given any adversary strategy rn (or σn) and any node h ∈
H ∪ L, let PfT (h) be fT ’s reaching probability for h. We
have: if x1 ∼ r1,
P(r1,piT\{1})(h) =
∑
pi1∈Π1
x1(π1)P(pi1,piT\{1})(h).
Then xT ’s reaching probability for h is:
∑
(r1,piT\{1})∈FT
xT (r1, πT\{1})P(r1,piT\{1})(h)
=
∑
(r1,piT\{1})∈FT ,r1∼x1
xT (r1, πT\{1})
∑
pi1∈Π1
x1(π1)P(pi1,piT\{1})(h)
=
∑
(pi1,piT\{1})∈ΠT
∑
(r1,piT\{1})∈FT ,r1∼x1
xT (r1, πT\{1})x1(π1)P(pi1,piT\{1})(h)
=
∑
(pi1,piT\{1})∈ΠT
xT (π1, πT\{1})P(pi1,piT\{1})(h),
which is xT ’s reaching probability for h. Hence, xT ∼ xT .
Theorem 1. ∀xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ), ∃xT ∈ ∆(FT ) such that
UT (xT , σn) = UT (xT , σn)(∀σn ∈ Σn), and vice versa.
Proof. By Lemma 1, ∀xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ), ∃xT ∈ ∆(FT ) such
that xT ∼ xT . For each σn ∈ Σn, let pσn(l) be the probabil-
ity reaching terminal node l by xT or xT . Then,
UT (xT , σn)
=
∑
fT∈FT
UT (fT , σn)xT (fT )
=
∑
l∈L
pσn(l)uT (l)c(l)
=
∑
piT∈ΠT
UT (πT , σn)xT (πT )
=UT (xT , σn).
Similarly, by Lemma 2, ∀xT∈∆(FT ), ∃xT ∈ ∆(ΠT ) such
that UT (xT , σn)=UT (xT , σn)(∀σn ∈ Σn).
Proposition 1. CMB converges in at most 2|Π1| |ΠT ||Π1| steps.
Proof. Given the adversary strategy rn, suppose that fT =
(r1, πT\{1}) is a best response for the team. Let x1 be a
realization-equivalent normal-form strategy of r1 with its
support set Sx1 = {π1 | x1(π1) > 0, π1 ∈ Π1}. Then,
(x1, πT\{1}) and fT are realization-equivalent with:
UT (fT , rn)
=UT ((x1, πT\{1}), rn)
=
∑
pi1∈Sx1
x1(π1)UT (π1, πT\{1}, rn).
Note that, if (x1, πT\{1}) is a best response against rn, then
(π1, πT\{1})(∀π1 ∈ Sx1) is also a best response against rn.
Then, for any π1 ∈ Sx1 we have UT (π1, πT\{1}, rn) =
UT (fT , rn).
11 Therefore, for any r′1 ∈ R1 with a realization-
equivalent normal-form strategy x′1 such that Sx′1 = Sx1 ,
UT (r
′
1, πT\{1}, rn)
=
∑
pi1∈Sx1
x′1(π1)UT (π1, πT\{1}, rn)
=UT (x1, πT\{1}, rn)
=UT (fT , rn).
For each Π′1 ⊆ Π1, we can define a set of pure hybrid-form
strategies:
FT (Π
′
1, πT\{1})
={(r1, πT\{1}) ∈ FT | Sx1 = Π
′
1(⊆ Π1), x1 ∼ r1}.
where ∀fT ∈ FT (Π
′
1, πT\{1}), fT is a best response against
rn if ∃ f
′
T ∈ FT (Π
′
1, πT\{1}) is a best response against
rn. In CMB, only the best response against rn, which must
be better than any strategy in F ′T against rn, will be added
to F ′T . Therefore, only one strategy f
′
T in FT (Π
′
1, πT\{1})
11If there is π1 ∈ Sx1 such that UT (π1, πT\{1}, rn) <
UT ((x1, πT\{1}), rn), then there is π
′
1 ∈ Sx1 such that
UT (π
′
1, πT\{1}, rn) > UT ((x1, πT\{1}), rn), and then higher
UT ((x1, πT\{1}), rn) is achieved by moving the probability for
π1 to π
′
1, which causes a contradiction.
will be added to F ′T , i.e., the set of pure hybrid-form strate-
gies FT (Π
′
1, πT\{1}) is represented by a single strategy f
′
T
in F ′T . In the worst case, CMB needs to add strategies in-
volving all these sets (the number of these sets is up to
2|Π1|
∏
i∈T\{1} |Πi|), and then CMB will terminate within
2|Π1| |ΠT ||Π1| iterations.
Proposition 2. There is a TMECor (xT , rn) with |SxT | ≤
|Σn|.
Proof. There is TMECor (xT , rn) with |SxT | ≤ |Σn|
(Celli and Gatti 2018). We know that there is x ∈ ∆(FT )
with |SxT | = |SxT | such that xT ∼ xT by Lemma 1. By
Theorem 1, UT (xT , σn) = UT (xT , σn)(∀σn ∈ Σn). Then,
(xT , rn) is a TMECor, concluding the proof.
Theorem 2. CMB converges to a TMECor in (FT ,Σn).
Proof. By Proposition 1, CMB will terminate with v =
v within a finite number of iterations. Then, we have,
UT (xT , rn) = v = v ≥ UT (x
′
T , rn)(∀x
′
T ), and
−UT (xT , rn) = −v ≥ −UT (xT , r
′
n)(∀r
′
n). Therefore,
(xT , rn) is a TMECor.
Proposition 3. If CMB terminates with v − v ≤ ǫ, then its
output (xT , rn) is an ǫ-TMECor in (FT ,Σn).
Proof. UT (x
′
T , rn)− UT (xT , rn) ≤ v − v ≤ ǫ (∀x
′
T ), and
−UT (xT , r
′
n) − (−UT (xT , rn)) ≤ −v − (−v) = 0(∀r
′
n).
Therefore, (xT , rn) is an ǫ-TMECor.
Proposition 4.
∏
i∈T ri(σT (i)) with ri ∈ Ri for all i ∈
T \ {1} and r1 ∈ R1 is exactly represented by w(σT ) in
Eqs.(6a) and (6b).
Proof.
∏
i∈T ri(σT (i)) = r1(σT (1)) if ri(σT (i)) = 1(∀i ∈
T \ {1}), otherwise
∏
i∈T ri(σT (i)) = 0. First, by Eq.(6b),
0 ≤ r1(σT (1)) − w(σT ) ≤ n − 2 − (n − 2) = 0 if
ri(σT (i)) = 1(∀i ∈ T \ {1}), i.e., w(σT ) = r1(σT (1)).
Second, by Eq.(6a), w(σT ) = 0 if any i ∈ T \ {1} with
ri(σT (i)) = 0. Then,
∏
i∈T ri(σT (i)) is exactly represented
by w(σT ) in Eqs.(6a) and (6b).
Theorem 3. The solution of problem (5) solves problem (8).
Proof. Suppose that a sequence-form strategy ri of player
i is feasible in Problem (5) but is infeasible in Problem
(8). By Proposition 4, w(×i∈T seqi(l)) is exactly repre-
sented by Eqs.(6a) and (6b). Therefore, ri does not sat-
isfy the constraints in Eq.(7). Without loss of generality,
we assume that
∑
a∈χ(Ii,j)
ri(σT (i)a) = ri(σT (i)), but∑
a∈χ(Ii,j)
w(σT (i)a, σT\{i}) 6= w(σT ). We have:
∑
a∈χ(Ii,j)
w(σT (i)a, σT\{i}) 6= w(σT )
⇒
∑
a∈χ(Ii,j)
ri(σT (i)a)
∏
j∈T\{i}
rj(σT (j)) 6= ri(σT (i))
∏
j∈T\{i}
rj(σT (j))
⇒
∑
a∈χ(Ii,j)
ri(σT (i)a) 6= ri(σT (i)),
which causes a contradiction. Therefore, The feasible solu-
tion of Problem (5) is feasible in Problem (8).
Corollary 1. Given rn, the optimal solution of Problem (8)
is a best response against rn.
Proof. By Proposition 4 and Theorem 3, the feasible solu-
tion of Problem (5) is feasible in Problem (8) (and both prob-
lems have the same sequence-form strategy space), and the
objective functions in both problems are the same. There-
fore, the optimal solution of Problem (8) is optimal in Prob-
lem (5), concluding the proof.
C Associated Constraints of Kuhn Poker
In a four-player Kuhn poker game, the information set for
player i is defined by the card that player i holds and the
observed actions taken by players in turn. For example,
J:/cccr: is an information set of player 1 reachable by se-
quence J:/:c, in which player 1 has a card J and observed
the actions ‘c,c,c,r’ of all players in turn. There are two
possible actions player 1 can take: call (c) and fold (f).
Therefore, by Eq.(1b), we have r1(J:/:c) = r1(J:/cccr:c) +
r1(J:/cccr:f). This information set may contain many pos-
sible nodes because of the uncertainty in what cards of
other players hold. Each node in the information set cor-
responds to a sequence for each player from the root to
this node. For example (J:/:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c, K:/ccc:r) and
(J:/:c, Q:/c:c, K:/cc:c, T:/ccc:r) are two different nodes in
this information set with different cards of players 3 and 4.
Apparently, there are many different joint sequences for the
team to reach an information set, corresponding to differ-
ent nodes in this information set, e.g., (J:/:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c)
or (J:/:c, Q:/c:c, K:/cc:c). Because player 1 acts in this in-
formation set and chooses from two possible actions, for
given a joint sequence (J:/:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c) that leads to
this information set, there exist the extended joint sequences
(J:/cccr:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c) and (J:/cccr:f, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c)
that lead to some immediately succeeding information sets.
Therefore, we can generate the following associated con-
straint (note that w(σT ) =
∏
i∈T ri(σT (i))):
w(J:/:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c)
=w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c)
+ w(J:/cccr:f, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c),
because of r1(J:/c:c) = r1(J:/cccr:c)+ r1(J:/cccr:f). More-
over, given w(J:/:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:r), we have the following
associated constraint:
w(J:/:c, Q:/c:c,∅)
=w(J:/:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:r)
+ w(J:/:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c).
In addition, given w(J:/:c, Q:/c:r,∅), the following associ-
ated constraint holds:
w(J:/:c, Q:/c:c,∅) + w(J:/:c, Q:/c:r,∅)
=w(J:/:c,∅,∅)
=r1(J:/:c).
Note that w(∅,∅,∅) = r1(∅) = 1.
Assume that the team’s joint sequence
(J:/cccr:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c) reaches a node
(J:/cccr:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c, K:/ccc:r) in player 2’s infor-
mation set Q:/cccrc:. Because player 2 can also choose
from two actions c and f , we can generate an associated
constraint:
w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/c:c, T:/cc:c)
=w(J:/cccr:c,Q:/cccrc:c,T:/cc:c)
+ w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:f, T:/cc:c).
Subsequently, when the team’s joint sequence
(J:/cccr:c,Q:/cccrc:c,T:/cc:c) reaches a node
(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cc:c, K:/ccc:r) in player 3’s
information set T:/cccrcc: (also with two actions c and f ),
we have an associated constraint:
w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cc:c)
=w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:c)
+ w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:f).
Here, nodes (J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:c, K:/ccc:r)
and w(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:f, K:/ccc:r)
are terminal nodes, and the team’s joint sequence
(J:/cccr:c, Q:/cccrc:c, T:/cccrcc:c) is considered in Problem
(5) as a joint sequence reaching a terminal node. Once we
enumerate all team members’ information sets according to
Eq.(7), we add all associated constraints corresponding to
these joint sequences reaching terminal nodes to Problem
(8).
D Definitions of Evaluation Domains
The rules of these games are according to the standard set-
ting (Abou Risk, Szafron et al. 2010; Farina et al. 2018).
D.1 Kuhn Poker Games
nKr includes n players and r possible cards. Each player
pays one chip to the pot before the cards are dealt, and then
is dealt one private card. The game players take actions in
turns. There is one betting round with one bet, i.e., adding
one chip to the pot. The first player may bet or check. After
that, a player can check (call) or bet (raise) if there is no
bet; otherwise, a player can call or fall if there is a bet. At
the showdown, the player who has not folded and has the
highest card wins all chips.
D.2 Leduc Poker Games
nLr includes n players and r ranks (i.e., 3r cards). The ini-
tial setting is the same as the one in Kuhn poker games. How-
ever, there are two betting rounds, the first one is called pre-
flop (with the preflop bet: two chips), and the second one is
called flop (with the flop bet: four chips). Each betting round
is the same as the one in Kuhn poker games. After the pre-
flop betting, one community card is dealt (all players can see
its information), then the flop betting begins. After the flop
betting, players who did not fold showdown (reveal the pri-
vate cards). The player who pairs the community card with
her private card wins the pot; otherwise, the player who has
the highest card wins. If some players have the same card
and win, they split the pot.
